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Kroblin: Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace

NOTE
EXPANDING THE
JURISDICTIONAL REACH FOR
INTENTIONAL TORTS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CYBER
CONTACTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last century, the courts have slowly relaxed
Constitutional constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out of state defendants.1 Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit permitted a California district
court to exercise jurisdiction over an out of state defendant on
the basis of a letter sent by the defendant in Georgia, to a
third party in Virginia. 2 It appears that, at least in the Ninth
Circuit, expansive interpretations of the courts' jurisdictional
powers will continue into the twenty-first century.
Originally, the foundation of jurisdictional jurisprudence
in the United States rested on the premise that no state could
exercise jurisdiction over a person outside its territorial borders. 3 With the advent of modern industrial society, solely territorial based notions of sovereignty and jurisdiction became
strained and unworkable. 4 The concept that a state has control over everything within its borders and nothing beyond began to erode. 5 As a result, during the twentieth century, the
1 See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS ch., 2 §§ B, C
(7th ed. 1997).
2 See generally Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082
(9th Cir. 2000).
3 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
70-71 (3rd ed. 1996).
4 See generally McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
5 See generally Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (which discussed that notice
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courts began to shift their focus from a territorial concept of
jurisdiction to a notice-based concept. 6 State courts exercised
jurisdictional powers beyond their geographical territory so
long as the party over whom the court sought jurisdiction had
fair notice that jurisdiction might be asserted. 7 The requirement that a party have notice refers to both the rules concerning the actual service of process and the Constitutional
limits imposed by the due process clause. 8 It is the latter requirement that is the subject of this note.
With the development of the Internet, deeply rooted territorial based concepts of jurisdiction have clashed with the notice-based system. 9 While courts have moved towards a noticebased system, generally some tangible link with the forum
state is found that gives rise to the constitutionally based notice requirement. 1o Within the context of the Internet, courts
have struggled with how to apply the notice-based system because Internet contacts occur in cyberspace rather than in a
particular territory.H If cyber-contacts alone constituted suffiserves to put non-residents on equal jurisdictional footing with residents and therefore a party need not be actually physically present within the state in order for process to be served). See generally Gray v. American Radiator, 176 N.E.2d. 761 (Ill.
1961). In Gray, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed a district court's grant of a
motion to squash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction over an out of
state defendant alleged to have committed tortious conduct resulting in an injury in
Illinois. See id at 761. There, the defendant allegedly negligently manufactured a
valve on a water heater causing injury to the plaintiff in the State of Illinois. See id.
at 762. See generally Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
6 See Gray,176 N.E.2d. at 765 (discussing McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-224).
7 See Gray,176 N.E.2d. at 765-767. Corporations are treated similarly to persons
for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. See Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S.
19, 24 (1930). To say a corporation is present within a state's jurisdiction for the purposes of satisfying the due process requirement is to say a corporation's activities
within the state satisfy the due process clause. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-317 (1945) (discussing Klein, 282 U.S. at 24).
8 See generally COUND, supra note 1, ch. 2-3.
9 The Internet has been defined as "a worldwide network of computers that enables various individuals and organizations to share information. The internet allows
computer users to access millions of web sites and web pages. A web page is a computer data file that can include names, words, messages, pictures, sounds, and links
to other information." Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
10 See Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1142,
1148-1149 (D. Or. 2000). See CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th
Cir. 1996). See Panauision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
11 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-420 (9th Cir. 1997);
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cient notice to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in a distant
state, a court's ability to exercise its jurisdictional authority
beyond its own territory would be greatly expanded. Courts
have attempted to limit their jurisdictional reach into cyberspace by distinguishing web sites that passively provide information or advertisements from those that facilitate the exchange of information or do business over the Internet. 12
The exercise of jurisdiction based on remote contacts is
not a new concept. 13 The United States Supreme Court attempted to expand the notice-based concept of jurisdiction to
permit the exercise of jurisdiction when geographic or physical contacts are lacking.14 In Calder v. Jones,15 the Court held
that jurisdiction was proper over a defendant in a foreign jurisdiction who purposefully directed tortious conduct from one
state to an individual in the forum state. 16 This note will discuss the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc,17 which broadly interpreted
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320-1322; Tech Heads, 105 F.Supp.2d at 1147-1149 (D. Or.
2000). For example, an Internet user in one state may now visit an Internet site of a
citizen in another state. Cyber space is the on-line world of computer networks. See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 287 (10th ed. 2000).
12 See Tech Heads, 105 F.Supp.2d at 1148-1149. For an informative discussion of
the differences of passive, active, and interactive web sites. See id at 1148-1151. A
. passive web site generally only furnishes information to those who visit the site, and
is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1149-1150.
See also Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F.Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997). Further complicating matters, a home page or web site on the Internet is not necessarily created by a
corporate entity but may also be created by an individual. Thus, an individual who
conducts business over the Internet may now be subjected to the jurisdiction of a forum state the same way a corporation would be. In Panavision, the court found the
burden of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant was significant but not determinative. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. While it may not be that burdensome or unreasonable for a huge corporate entity to defend itself in an out of state court, it
seems less fair that one individual could be suddenly subjected to jurisdictional
claims throughout the country.
13 See generally Hess, 274 U.S. 352; Gray, 176 N.E.2d. 761.
14 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
15 See id.
16 See id. at 791.
17 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). The appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California was argued and submitted April 13,
2000 before Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder, Circuit Judge Joseph T. Sneed, and
Circuit Judge Stephen S. Trott. See id. The decision was filed August 18, 2000. Circuit Judge Schroeder authored the opinion. See id. Circuit Judge Sneed filed a con-
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tortious conduct in an effort to extend its jurisdictional reach
on the most intangible contacts. The court's decision stretches
the definition of forum related activities so far, that it largely
divests the limitation of any purpose in the context of intentional torts.

II.

FACTS

&

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bancroft & Masters Inc. brought suit against Augusta
National, Inc. in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment for non-dilution 18 and non-infringement.19 Bancroft, a
small California corporation, sold computer and networking
products, and support services. 20 Bancroft conducted nearly all
of its business in San Francisco, California. 21 Bancroft has
owned and operated the Internet domain name 22 "masters.com" since February 8, 1995. 23 Augusta, a Georgia corporation, operated the Augusta National Golf Club in Georgia. 24
Augusta's club sponsored the annual Masters golf tournacurring opinion in which Circuit Judge Trott joined. See id.
18 The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods and services, regardless of the presence or absence of(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1991 & Supp. V 2000).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1991). Bancroft also sought an order canceling Augusta's
federally registered trademarks. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National,
Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 777, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1998). Infringement is defined as a violation
of another's intellectual-property right. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION 314
(1996).
20 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
21 See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1084
(9th Cir. 2000).
22 The term "domain name" means any alphanumeric designation, which is registered with, or assigned by any domain registrar, domain registry, or other domain
name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet. See 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1991 & Supp V 2000). "Every web page his its own web site which is
its address, similar to a telephone number or street address. Every web site on the
Internet has an identifier called a "domain name." The domain name often consists of
a person's name or a company's name or trademark. For example, Pepsi has a. web
page with a web site consisting of the company name, Pepsi, and .com, the "top level"
domain designation; Pepsi.com." Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.
1998).
23 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
24 See id. at 779.
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ment. 25 Augusta owned several federally registered 26 trademarks 27 for the mark "Masters" and operated a web site at
the domain name "masters.org."28
In 1997, Augusta sent a letter to Network Solutions Inc.,
(hereinafter, "NSI"), contesting Bancroft's right to use the
"masters. com" domain name. 29 At the time, NSI was the only
registrar administering domain names in the United States. 3D
Augusta's letter to NSI triggered NSI's dispute resolution policy for disputes between registered holders of Internet domain
names and holders of the same or similar registered trademark names. 31 According to NSI's policy, Bancroft's domain
name "masters. com" would be placed on hold unless it filed
suit against Augusta seeking a declaratory judgment establishing its right to use the "masters. com" domain name. 32 Consequently, Bancroft brought suit against Augusta. 33
The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction because the letter Augusta sent to NSI did
25

See id.

The term "registered mark" means a mark registered under the Lanham Act
or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of
March 19, 1920. See 15 U.S.C. 1127 (1991). The term "mark" includes any trademark,
service mark, collective mark, or certification mark. See id.
27 The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1991).
28 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1084.
29 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 779. Augusta also sent a letter to Bancroft in
California but this fact was not relied by Bancroft at trial and is not pertinent to the
court's analysis. See id. at 779, 782.
30 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1084-1085. For an interesting discussion of the evolution of the domain name system see Image Online Design, Inc. v. Core Association,
120 F. Supp. 2d 870, 872-875 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
31 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085. Under the policy Bancroft could (1) transfer
the "masters. com" domain name to Augusta; (2) allow the domain to be placed on
hold which would mean that neither party could use it until the dispute was settled;
or (3) seek a declaratory judgement from a court of competent jurisdiction, establishing its right to the "masters. com" domain name. See id.
32 See id. A person seeking to have a declaration of her property rights or duties
may ask for such a declaration and the court may make a binding declaration of her
rights or duties whether or not further relief is claimed at that time. See CAL. CN.
PRoe. CODE § 1060 (West Supp. 2000). Had the domain name been placed on hold,
neither party could have used the domain name during the settlement of the dispute.
See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085.
33 See id.
26
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not satisfy the "effects" doctrine"34 under the purposeful availment prong of the test for specific jurisdiction. 35 The court
also concluded that the contacts with the forum state did not
give rise to the cause of action because the intellectual property dispute did not arise out of Augusta's letter to NSI. 36
Furthermore, the court stated that it "would be unreasonable
to require an intellectual property owner to risk having to
submit to the jurisdiction of an alleged infringer in order to
exercise his rights."37 Bancroft appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 3s

III.

BACKGROUND

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, a state may not
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. 39 Judgments affecting the rights and obligations of a party, over which a court lacks personal jurisdiction, offend a party's due process rights. 40 The United States
34 In tort cases a defendant satisfies the purposeful availment prong if the
defendant performs the following: (1) an intentional act (2) that is expressly aimed at
the forum state (3) which causes harm, the brunt of which is suffered in the forum
state and the defendant knows the harm is likely to be suffered there. See Core-Vent
Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
35 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 783. California permits the exercise of jurisdiction over an out of state defendant under CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 415.40 (West Supp.
2000).
36 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
37 1d. citing Douglas Furniture Co. v. Wood Dimensions, Inc 963 F.Supp. 899, 903
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
38 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085. On appeal Bancroft essentially argued, inter
alia, that based on Augusta's letter to NSI the district court had a sufficient basis for
exercising specific jurisdiction over Augusta. See id.
39 The 14th Amendment states in relevant part; "[nlo State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Untied
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Jurisdiction is defined as: 1) a
government's general power to exercise authority over all persons and things within
its territory. 2) A court's power to decide a case or issue a decree. 3) A geographic
area within which political or judicial authority may be exercised. 4) A political or judicial subdivision within such an area. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 855 (7th ed. 1999).
The tribunal before which an action is tried, must be competent by its constitution
which created its power to render a judgment over the proceeding. Pennoyer, 95 U.S.
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Supreme Court addressed the extent to which a state may exercise its jurisdictional powers in the seminal case Pennoyer v.
Neff.41 In Pennoyer, the Court stated that a forum state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over an absent nonresident
defendant only if the defendant appeared in the court, was
found within the state, was a resident thereof, or had property therein. 42 The Court held that a state court violates due
process when it enters a judgment against a person without
jurisdiction over that person. 43
The Pennoyer requirement of actual physical presence
within the forum state became particularly strained with the
advent of the automobile. 44 Due to automobile accidents inat 733. When the subject matter involves the personal liability of a defendant, the
due process clause requires that the defendant appear before the court or alternatively the court may bring the person of the defendant within its jurisdiction through
personal service of process. Personal jurisdiction is against the person of the defendant by service of process, whereas in rem jurisdiction is a procedure against property
located within the jurisdictional territory of the court and does not personally bind
the defendant beyond the property in question. [d. at 724. This note's discussion is
limited to personal jurisdiction.
41 95 U.S. 714. In Pennoyer, plaintiff Neff sought to recover a tract of land in Oregon to which defendant Pennoyer claimed title and right of possession. See id. at
719. The Court determined that the judgment entered in the prior proceeding against
Neff was invalid from defects in both the affidavit from which the order of publication was obtained, and in the affidavit by which the publication was proved in that
proceeding. See id. at 720. The Court affirmed that the judgment was invalid on
other grounds. See id. at 721-722.
42 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720 (citing the Code of Oregon's then existing provision for the service of process on a non-resident, absent defendant with property in
the state.) See id. The Court found no personal jurisdiction because the defendant
was not a resident of Oregon, he was not found within the state, and he did not appear before the court. See id. The Court further stated that when jurisdiction is exercised based on property, jurisdiction was proper only to the extent of such property at
the time jurisdiction is attached. See id.
43 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-734. While a statute provided for jurisdiction over
out of state defendants with property in the Oregon, the Pennoyer Court invalidated
the judgment because jurisdiction based on the property had not attached before the
court entered judgment. See id. at 728. The Code of Oregon declared "that no natural
person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of the State, "unless he appear in the
court, or be found within the State, or be a resident thereof, or have property therein;
and in the last case, only to the extent of such property at the time the jurisdiction
attached." [d. at 720.
44 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (involving a Massachusetts statute providing for automatic service of process within the state for all out of state motorists). The Court found that by the operation of a motor vehicle in another state,
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volving out of state parties, states enacted "long arm statutes," which allowed state courts to assert personal jurisdiction over out of state defendants. 45 The Court recognized the
public policy served by such statutes and held that such statutes did not offend the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment thereby heralding the beginning of the end of territorial based notions of personal jurisdiction. 46 Today, many
state long arm statues simply provide for the exercise of jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowable by the due process
clause. 47
The Court again addressed the limits on the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants imposed by the due process clause in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 48 The International Shoe Court decided whether the State of Washington could permissibly exercise jurisdiction over a Delaware
corporation conducting activities in Washington. 49 The Court
noted that while historically the exercise of jurisdiction over a
person was based on the actual presence of that person within
a court's territorial jurisdiction, the focus had shifted to
whether the defendant had notice that personal jurisdiction
the driver had given implied consent to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the foreign state for proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions. See id. at 356.
45 See id. at 354. These statutes provided that the operation of a motor vehicle in
the state was evidence of the driver's acceptance of rights and responsibilities including a designated registrar in the state on whom process could be served. See id. at
357.
46 See id. at 356-357.
47 See Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996), California's
long arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Constitution of the
United States. See also CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 415.40 (West Supp. 2000). A person
outside the State of California may be served in any manner under Article 3 Manner
of Service of Summons or by sending a copy of the summons by first class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. See also CAL. Crv. PROC. § 410.10 (West Supp.
2000). Federal courts apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum state in which
they sit in diversity of jurisdiction cases. See Murray Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796
F.2d 1070, 1072-1073 (9th Cir. 1986). This note will only address these constitutional
limits imposed by the due process clause and will not deal with any state's self imposed statutory limitations.
48 See 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945).
49 See id. A corporation is a person and while it maybe a fiction, it is a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact. See Klein v. Board of Supervisors,
282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930).
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may be asserted. 50 The Court stated that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper so long as
the defendant had "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "51 The
Court clarified that the test is not merely quantitative, but
depends on the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts
ties and relations. 52 The Court concluded that systematic and
continuous contacts resulting in a large amount of business
with the forum state all of which received the benefits and
protections of that state were sufficient to justify the exercise
of personal jurisdiction. 53
Following International Shoe, the Court assumed the
terms "general" and "specific" jurisdiction to distinguish the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in suits that arise out of a
defendant's contacts with the forum from suits that do not
See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
See id., citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Where a person engages in activities, which afford him of the privileges and protections of a state, the
state may exact reciprocal duties involving the incidences of citizenship. See International Shoe, 326·U.S. at 316. So where the suit involved those activities and extraterritorial service of process was actually accomplished, traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice required by due process are satisfied. See Milliken, 311 U.S.
at 463.
62 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. The court stated that when a corporation has continuous and systematic contacts that give rise to the liabilities sued on
"presence" within the forum exists. See id. at 317. However, casual presence or isolated activities in the forum state do not satisfy the requirements of due process
when the suit does not arise out of such activities. See id.
63 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. International Shoe was a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business is in St. Louis, Missouri. See id. at
313. It had no offices in the State of Washington. See id. The corporation did not
make contracts for sale or purchase in the state nor did it maintain stocks of merchandise in Washington. See id. International Shoe's only connection with Washington was through its approximately thirteen salesmen who resided there. See id.
These salesmen exhibited their samples to customers in Washington and then transmitted .orders to the corporation's St. Louis office from where they were supervised.
See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-314. The salesman had no authority to enter
into contracts or make collections and all shipments were shipped f.o.b. from out of
state. See id. at 314. The Court found that the privilege of employing salesman
within Washington gave rise to the right of the State of Washington to collect a tax
imposed on the exercise of this privilege. See id. at 320-321. Therefore, International"
Shoe's contacts should have put it on notice that it may be haled into a Washington
court regarding those contacts and therefore doing so was not unreasonable under
the traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice. See id. at 321.
50

61
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arise out of those contacts. 54 Thus, when a court exercises jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a suit arising out of the
defendant's contacts with the forum it is commonly referred to
as "specific" jurisdiction. 55 Conversely, when the defendant
has significant contacts with the forum state, courts will exercise what is commonly referred to as "general" jurisdiction, regardless of whether the suit arises out of the defendant's forum related activities. 56

A.

GENERAL JURISDICTION

This note will only briefly discuss general personal jurisdiction because the Ninth Circuit in Bancroft & Masters, Inc.
u. Augusta National, Inc. focused on specific jurisdiction. The
United States Supreme Court considered whether sufficient
contacts existed with the State of Texas to permit the exercise
of general personal jurisdiction over the defendant in
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. u. Hall. 57 In
Helicopteros, the Court concluded that even when the cause of
action does not arise out of the defendant's forum related activities, the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate due process so long as the defendant has sufficient contacts with the
forum state. 58 The Court stated that mere purchases, even if
occurring at regular intervals, do not constitute sufficient contacts to warrant the exercise of general personal jurisdiction
54 See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, et ai., 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8-9 (1984), citing Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to adjudicate: A suggested
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136-1164 (1966); Brilmayer, How Contacts Count:
Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S. CT. REV. 77; 80-81; and
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408.
58 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. The Court relied on Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), where the Court considered whether or not
jurisdiction was proper by an Ohio court over a defendant Philippine mining corporation. See id. at 438. The corporation had maintained an Office in Ohio, held meetings
there, maintained records, distributed salary checks and used an Ohio bank as a
transfer agent during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. See id. at 448. The
Court found that where continuous and systematic contacts were shown the exercise
of general jurisdiction over the corporation for unrelated causes of action was permissible. See id. at 448.
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over a defendant. 59 Therefore, the Court found that the
defendant's contacts with Texas did not rise to the level of
continuous and systematic contacts. 60
B.

SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

The United States Supreme Court addressed the criteria
for finding personal jurisdiction when the suit arises out of a
defendant's contacts with the forum in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz. 61 In Burger King, the Court discussed whether the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Florida court over a Michigan
resident in a breach of contract action violated the due process clause. 62 The Court restated that an individual's liberty
interest63 is protected by the due process clause if that individual has fair warning that his activities will subject him to
the jurisdictional reach of the forum. 64 The Court applied the
two-part test set out in International Shoe, requiring a showing of minimum contacts, ties, or relations with the forum
59 See id at 418. See also Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S.
516 (1923). An Oklahoma retail store that sent a buyer on regular trips to New York
to purchase clothing did not subject buyer to personal jurisdiction in New York. See
id. But see Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 n.12 (where the Court clarifies that the continuing validity of Rosenberg with respect to specific jurisdiction was not decided by
the Helicopteros Court since this was purely a case involving the exercise of general
jurisdiction).
60 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. Helicopteros' contacts with the state of Texas
consisted of a contract-negotiating session in Texas attended by its chief executive officer, acceptance of checks drawn on a Texas bank account, the purchase of helicopters, equipment, training services from a Texas corporation and sending personnel to
Texas for training. See id.
61 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
62 See id. at 463.
63 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702-703 n.10 (1982) (where the Supreme Court rejected in dicta, the notion that
personal jurisdiction was governed by the federalism concept of restricting states'
power). Instead it is the individual's liberty interest as preserved by the due process
clause, which limits a state's power to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
See id. While personal jurisdiction embodies an element of federalism it clearly does
not operate as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of a court because if
it did it would not be possible for a defendant to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement. See id.
64 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-472, citing and quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977); See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 n.13 (1945).
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state and a showing that maintenance of jurisdiction based on
those contacts, ties, or relations does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 65
The Court in Burger King noted that in order to satisfy
the minimum contacts requirement, the contacts must be
such that a defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled
into the forum's courtS. 66 The Court stated that a defendant
could reasonably anticipate being haled into a forum state if
the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of
conducting activities in the forum.67 In Burger King, defendant Rudzewicz entered into a twenty-year franchise agreement with the restaurant chain, a Florida corporation with its
principal place of business in Florida. 68 The franchise agreement was Rudzewicz's only significant contact with Florida. 69
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
See id. at 474. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980) (where the Supreme Court distinguishes that the forseeability of
causing injury in another forum is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising personal
jurisdiction, but rather it is conduct that should make a defendant reasonably anticipate being haled into the forum's court). In World-Wide, the plaintiff's had purchased
an automobile and driven it to another state where they were involved in an accident. See id. at 288. The Court found that the car was being used as intended after
its purchase and was therefore in the stream of consumption. See id. at 298-299. This
aspect distinguishes this case from cases where a defendant puts a product into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that the product would reach the forum
state. See id. Thus, the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum
state did not satisfy the forseeability of being haled into court requirement of the
minimum contacts prong. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297-299.
67 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-475. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, the Court found that unilateral activities of the plaintiff
such as the carrying on of bits of trust administration, would not satisfy the minimum contact's requirement where the defendant has not engaged in any purposeful
acts towards the forum. See id. at 253. The Burger King Court distinguished Hanson
from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), where a non-resident
defendant was haled into a California court. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-476.
There, the Court found that jurisdiction was proper because the life insurance offer
was accepted in the State of California and all payments were made from there giving the contract a substantial connection with the forum. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
However, in Hanson, the contract was executed in Delaware by a resident of Pennsylvania. See id. at 238. The Burger King Court also noted that in McGee, California
had a strong interest in providing effective redress to its citizens for an activity
deemed by a California statute to be exceptional and subject to special regulation.
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483.
68 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-480.
69 See id. at 479-480. The Court stated that the purposeful availment require65

68
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The Court found that Rudzewicz contemplated continuing and
wide-reaching contacts with Burger King and that the longterm contract provided Rudzewicz the benefits of affiliation
with Burger King in Florida. 70 The Court concluded that
Rudzewicz's purposeful availment of the protection and benefits of the forum state's laws made it reasonably foreseeable
that he might be haled into a Florida court. 71 Thus, the Court
found that Rudzewicz had purposefully availed himself of the
benefits and protections of the State of Florida thereby satisfying the minimum contacts test.72
The Burger King Court then considered whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction offended the "fair play and substantial justice" prong. 73 The Court noted that even if sufficient contacts with a forum state existed, the exercise of
jurisdiction may still offend the due process clause if it would
be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over the defendant. 74
ment was to ensure that a defendant would not be haled into court on the basis of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the forum state. See id. at 475. The
Court remarked that it has never held that a contract with an out of state party
alone would subject a defendant to a foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 478. The Court
further stated that in its opinion a contract alone cannot subject a defendant to a foreign jurisdiction. See id.
70 See Burger King, 471 US. at 479-480. The contract was executed in Florida,
was governed by the laws of Florida and disputes arising out of the contract were to
be governed by Florida law. See id. at 481. Furthermore, in their course of dealing
the parties made key negotiations not with the Michigan district office but with the
Miami office. See id. These included the negotiations that gave rise to the suit. See
id. at 480-481. The Court stated that factors such' as the contract's negotiation and
contemplated consequences, as well as its terms and the parties' course of dealing,
guided the Court in determining whether the defendant had purposefully availed
himself of contacts with the forum state. See id. at 479.
71 See Burger King, 471 US. at 482.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 476.
74 See id. at 477-478. There is a presumption of reasonableness upon a showing
of purposeful direction of activities towards the forum state which the defendant
bears the burden of overcoming by showing that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable. See Burger King, 471 US. at 477-478. In establishing reasonableness,
the Court looked to the extent of a defendant's purposeful inteIjection into the forum,
the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in the efficient resolution of controversies, the existence of an
alternative forum and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. See id. at 476-477. Additionally, the Court stated
that sometimes jurisdiction may be established on a lesser showing of minimum con-
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The Court recognized that Florida had a legitimate interest in
providing an effective means of redress for contractual disputes arising from contracts made in Florida and governed by
the laws of Florida. 75 Furthermore, Rudzewicz was an experienced businessman who had purposefully entered into an
agreement with Burger King obligating him to payments of
over $1 million dollars per year.76 Thus, the Court found that
Florida's exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable. 77
1. Intentional Torts

Courts are more permissive in their assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when the defendant has committed an intentional tort having an effect within the forum
state. 78 For example, in Calder v. Jones,79 two Florida residents, had written, edited, and published an article in the
National Enquirer, Inc. 80 Shirley Jones, a television entertainer and California resident, subsequently filed a libel action against them in California. 81 The United States Supreme
Court distinguished untargeted negligence, where jurisdiction
without more is not proper, from an intentional act expressly
aimed at a California resident. 82 Defendants' knowledge that
the article would potentially cause injury to Mrs. Jones, the
brunt of which would be felt in California, and defendants' intacts than necessary if the assertion of jurisdiction would be highly reasonable. See
id. at 477.
75 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483. The contract's choice of law provision, providing for Florida law to govern all contract disputes, resolved any possibility of conflicting substantive social policies. See id at 482.
76 See id. at 485-487.
77 See id. at 487.
78 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Panavision v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
79 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
80 See id. at 785-786.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 789. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that they were
like welders who had worked on a boiler that explodes in another state and were,
therefore, not subject to jurisdiction in California. See id. The Court stated that
under Buckeye Boiler Co, v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57 (Cal. 1969) and Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d. 761 (Ill. 1961), jurisdiction over the defendant was not proper because the defendant had engaged in mere
untargeted negligence and had no control over nor direct benefit from his employer's
sales in the forum state. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
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tentional publication of the article was enough to establish jurisdiction over the defendants. 83 The Court stated that even
though the defendants lacked the minimum contacts with
California normally necessary to assert specific jurisdiction,
their intentional direction of wrongdoing at a California resident made the exercise of jurisdiction proper. 84 Thus, the
Court held that intentional conduct calculated to cause injury
to an individual in California allowed a California court to assert jurisdiction over the defendants. 85

2. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted a
three-part test for determining whether specific jurisdiction
may be exercised without violating the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment. 86 In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,87
the court addressed whether the maintenance of a home page
on the world wide web, which. allegedly infringes on the use of
a service mark, established specific personal jurisdiction over
the infringer in the service mark holder's principal place of
business. 88 The court stated that in order for jurisdiction to be
proper, the defendant must; 1) either perform an act or transaction with the forum or perform an act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum;89 2) those activities giving rise to the
benefits and protections of the forum must also give rise to
See id. at 789-790.
84 See id.at 788-790.
85 See id. at 791. No contention was raised arguing the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
86 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. 130 F.3d 414, 416 (1997). See also Voysys
Corp v. Elk Industries, 1996 WL 119473 (N.D.Cal. 1996) (recognizing the modification
of the three-part test as stated in Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates,
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977)).
87 See 130 F.3d at 416.
88 See id. at 415.
89 See id. at 416. See also Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).
This "purposeful availment prong" does not require that the defendant have physical
contacts with the forum state as long as the defendant's efforts are purposefully directed towards that forum. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416-417. See also generally
CompuServe, Inc. V. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244 (2000).
83
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the cause of action;90 3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be
reasonable. 91 Cybersell presented a question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit; thus the court looked for guidance
from the Sixth and Second Circuits. 92
The Sixth Circuit previously addressed whether a Texas
resident, who had Internet contacts with CompuServe, an
Ohio corporation, had sufficient contacts to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause in CompuSerue, Inc. u.
Patterson. 93 In CompuSerue, the defendant transmitted
software files to CompuServe via the web under an agreement
governed by Ohio law. 94 CompuServe displayed the software to
its subscribers over the Internet, made sales of the software,
and transmitted money from the sales to the defendant in
Texas. 95 The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant's act of
sending software to Ohio indicated that the defendant knowingly reached out to purposefully avail himself of the privilege
of doing business in Ohio.96 Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that
the Ohio court properly exercised jurisdiction over the
defendant. 97
Conversely, the Second Circuit found jurisdiction improper in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. u. King. 98 In Bensusan,
the New York district court held that the creation of a passive
web page that potentially infringed on plaintiff's trademark
See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416. See also Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498.
See id.
92 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417.
93 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
94 See id. at 1260-1261.
95 See id. at 1261.'
96 See id. at 1266-1267. See also Kevin R. Lyn, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Is a Home Page Enough to Satisfy Minimum Contacts?, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV.
341, 350 (2000). Under the single point presence view taken by some courts the internet is a physically traveled highway. See id. Presence is determined by residence
of the defendant or location of the defendant's server and whether the defendant initiated the contacts with the forum state. See id.
97 See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268-1269.
98 937 F.Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.1997). The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on both due process grounds and on the
grounds that the exercise of jurisdiction was not allowed under New York's long arm
statute. See id. The Second Circuit affirmed but did not discuss the due process
grounds for dismissal. See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25
(2d Cir.1997). Cybersell thus looked to the district court's opinion. See Cybersell,130
F.3d at 417 n.4.
.
90

91
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was not a sufficient contact on which to base jurisdiction. 99
The district court distinguished the defendant's passive web
page from the defendant's activities in CompuServe. lOO The
court stated that in CompuServe, the defendant targeted the
State of Ohio by subscribing to CompuServe's service, entering an agreement, advertising, and sending software via the
Internet, all of which benefited the defendant's business. lOl By
contrast, in Bensusan, the defendant had not purposefully
availed himself in any way of the benefits of conducting business in New York.1 02 The district court concluded that the
mere potential for confusion by maintenance of the web site
did not satisfy the minimum contacts test.103 Consequently,
the court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 104
In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit found the defendant's actions more similar to those of the defendant in Bensusan. 105
The Florida defendant's only contact with the forum state, Arizona, occurred when Arizonans visited his home page over
the Internet.lo6 The court noted that in each case where
courts have found jurisdiction proper based on web contacts,
"something more" must be shown than a mere Internet adver99 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp at 301. In Bensusan, the defendant owned the "Blue
Note" jazz club in Columbia, Missouri. See id. at 297. The defendant created a web
page, advertising his club, which allowed browsers to order tickets by using the
names and addresses of ticket outlets in Columbia. See id. The site also showed a
phone number whereby browsers could call to order tickets for pickup at the club. See
id. Plaintiff, the owner of "The Blue Note" trademark and the "Blue Note" club in
Greenwich Village, sued the defendant for trademark infringement in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See id. at 297-298.
100 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 301. See Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service
Center, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148-1151 (D. Or. 2000) (for an informative discussion of the differences of passive, active, and interactive web sites). A passive web
site generally only furnishes information to those who visit the site, and is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1149-1150.
101 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp at 301. In CompuServe, the defendant sold under
$650 dollars worth of software to Ohio residents through the CompuServe shareware
service. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-1265

103

See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 301.
See id.

104

See id.

102

105

106

See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417-418.
See id. at 415.
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tisement. 107 The court stated that the nature and quality of
commercial activity conducted over the Internet directly relates to a court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. lOS The court held that the defendant's passive homepage,
which did not seek out or receive any part of its business
from Arizonans, did not constitute the contacts necessary to
satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. 109 The court
further rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's
home page satisfied the effects test for intentional torts because there was no evidence of intentional aiming at the forum state. 110 Interestingly, the court stated that the effects
test does not apply with equal force to corporations as it does
to individuals because corporations do not suffer from harm in
a particular location as individuals do. m Thus, the court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. 112
While finding that the effects test was not satisfied in
Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on the effects test in
Ziegler v. Indian River County.113 In Ziegler, the court noted
that it applied a different purposeful availment test for tort
cases than it did for contract cases. 114 In tort cases, jurisdiction could attach if the defendant merely engaged in conduct
aimed at and having an effect in the forum state. 115 In Ziegler,
a California plaintiff, John Ziegler, sued Florida defendants
for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights by having
him arrested for writing a fraudulent check that was valid at
See id. at 418.
108 See id. at 419, quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa.1997).
109 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420. The court noted that there was no evidence
that any Arizonan had ever even hit the defendant's web site besides the plaintiff.
See id. at 419. Furthermore the web page was not aimed intentionally at Arizona.
See id. at 420.
110 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
111 See id., quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486
(9th Cir. 1993). This statement implies that the effects test would be more difficult to
satisfy if the defendant is a corporation rather than an individual.
112 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
113 See 64 F.3d 470, 473-474 (9th Cir. 1995).
114 See id. at 473. The court rejected the contention that a contract with a resident of a foreign state is alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a breach of contract action and stated that it was consistent with the holding of Burger King. See
id., citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1993).
115 See id.
107
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the time written.U6 The court used a three-part effects test in
order to satisfy the purposeful availment prong for specific jurisdiction. ll7 The three parts are "(1) intentional action; (2)
aimed at the forum state; and (3) causing harm that the
defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the
forum state."U8
In Ziegler, the court found that the defendants had committed an intentional act by obtaining a warrant for Ziegler's
arrest in Florida, despite their apparent knowledge that no
crime had been committed. u9 The court deemed these actions
to be intentional acts expressly aimed at the forum state. 120
The court stated that because the defendants anticipated Ziegler's arrest in his home state of California, they had satisfied
the third part of the effects test. 121
In Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,122 the Ninth Circuit
applied the effects test as stated in Ziegler. 123 The Panavision
court considered whether the district court properly asserted
personal jurisdiction over the defendant Toeppen, who had
committed tortious conduct in cyberspace. 124 The court applied
the same three-part specific jurisdiction test used in Ziegler
See Ziegler, 64 F.3dat 473.
[d. at 474.
118 [d., citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486.
119 See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474.
120 See id.
121 See id. Because the effects test was satisfied, so too was the purposeful availment prong of the three part specific jurisdiction test used by the Ninth Circuit. See
id.
122 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
123 See id. at 1321-1322, citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473.
124 See id. Toeppen had registered Panavision's trademark as his domain name
through NSI. See id. at 1319. When Panavision attempted to register the Internet domain name "Panavision.com" it found Toeppen had already done so. See id. The site
merely contained a display of photographs of Pana, Illinois. See Panavision, 141 F.3d
at 1319. Panavision's counsel sent Toeppen a letter in an attempt to get Toeppen to
stop use of the site. See id. Toeppen responded by a letter which offered to sell the
"Panavision.com" domain name to Panavision for $13,000, an act often referred to as
cyber-squatting or cyber-piracy. See id at 1318-1319. Toeppen also promised not to
register other internet addresses alleged to be Panavision's if Panavision purchased
the web site. See id. When Panavision refused the defendant's demand, the defendant
registered Panavision's other trademark "Pananflex", as the domain name
"Panaflex.com". See id. The defendant's web page for "Panaflex.com" displayed only
the word "Hello." See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1318.
116

117
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and Cybersell. 125 The court then distinguished Panavision
from Cybersell. 126 Unlike Cybersell, involving inadvertent
trademark infringement, the plaintiff in Panavision brought
an action for intentional trademark dilution. 127 Thus, the
court stated that jurisdiction may be proper for tort cases if
the defendant's conduct was aimed at or had an effect in the
forum state. 128
The Panavision court then applied the effects test under
the purposeful availment prong of the test for specific jurisdiction. 129 The court found that the defendant, Toeppen, had purposefully engaged in a scheme to register Panavision's trademarks.1 30 Furthermore, Toeppen knew his conduct would
likely injure Panavision in California, its principal place of
business. 131 The court stated that physical contacts with the
See id. at 1321-1322. See also Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474.
See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321-1322. The Panavision court referred to the
Cybersell opinion's statement that "something more" is required than a mere Internet
advertisement to show that a defendant purposefully directed activities towards the
forum state. See id. (discussing Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418).
127 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321. In an action for trademark dilution, the
owner of a famous mark may only be entitled to injunctive relief unless willful intent
can be shown. See 15 US.C. § 1125(c) 2 (Supp. 2000). If such willful intent is proven,
"the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35 (a) and 36 [15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), 1118), subject to the discretion of the of the
court and the principles of equity." [d. But see the Cyberpiracy prevention act 15
US.C § 1125(d) was not in effect at the time of Panavision. See generally Sporty's
Farm L.L.C v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing the
application of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act).
128 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321, citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473.
129 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. See also generally Maggos v. Helm, No. 9815751, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 13244 (9th Cir. June 11, 1999) [unpublished opinion]
(where effects test is found to be satisfied).
130 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. Compare generally U-Haul International,
Inc. v. Osborne, No. CN 98-0366-PHX-RGS, 1999 US. Dist. LEXIS 14466 (D.Az. Feb
17, 1999) (where the first purposefully directed prong of the effects test was not satisfied by defendant's posting of web site that allegedly libeled plaintifi).
131 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. See also Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1487 (where
the court found that the corporate defendant was injured in its principal place of business but further stated it was not deciding the issue of where a corporation suffers
injury because that decision was unnecessary to the out come of the case). Toeppen
relied on Cybersell, to argue that a large corporation does not suffer injury in one location. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322 n.2. The court rejected Toeppen's contention,
remarking that since Panavision's principal place of business and its state of incorporation were both in the State of California, the court was not faced with the issue of
where a corporation suffers injury. See id. citing Core-Vent, 11F.3d at 1487. The court
125

126
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forum state were not necessary so long as activities were purposefully directed toward the forum state. 132 Thus, the effects
test had been satisfied. 133
The Panavision court· then stated that for jurisdiction to
be proper under the specific jurisdiction test, the claim asserted must arise out of the defendant's forum related activities. 134 Under this prong the court applied a "but for" causation test. 135 The Panavision court found that this "but for"
causation was satisfied because but for Toeppen's registration
of Panavision's trademarks, which was directed towards California, Panavision would not have suffered injury.13G
After satisfying the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test, the court noted that a plaintiff must still show
that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. 137 To establish reasonableness the court stated that all seven factors
stated in Burger King 138 must be weighed and no one factor
was dispositive.139 The court determined that that the degree
likened the harm suffered by Panavision to Indianapolis Colts v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410, 411-412 (7th Cir. 1994) (where the
court determined that the Baltimore CFL Colts team was subject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana because the team entered the State of Indiana by broadcasting games
to Indiana thereby injuring the Indianapolis Colts in Indiana where they primarily
used their trademarks). See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321-1322.
132 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320, citing Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498
(9th Cir. 1995.) The court did not mention the reply letter sent by Toeppen to Panavision in California, and apparently did not rely on physical contacts. See Panavision,
141 F.3d at 1316.
133 See id. at 1322. Compare Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105
F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 2000) (where the district court found no evidence that
Desktop intentionally directed its activities at Oregon). Thus, the effects test was not
met, however the "something more" requirement of Cybersell was met by evidence
that the web site was interactive rather than passive and the existence of additional
non-web site contacts with Oregon (Desktop conducted one transaction with a resident of Oregon). See id. See also Perry v. Righton.Com, 90 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1141 (D.
Or. 2000) (where the effects test was not satisfied because defendant did not intentionally direct activities at plaintiff in Oregon with the knowledge that the· plaintiff
would be injured).
134 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322, citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474.
135 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.
136 See id.
137 See id., citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-477.
138 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
139 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1488. See text
accompanying note 74.
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of Toeppen's purposeful interjection was substantial and that
California's strong interest in providing effective redress did
not conflict with the sovereignty of Illinois. 140 Furthermore,
the burden on Toeppen in litigating in California did not constitute a depravation of his right to due process, however the
alternative forum factor did weigh in his favor. 141 In weighing
these factors the court concluded that, on balance, Toeppen
had failed to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction
would be unreasonable. 142 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded the district court properly exercised specific
jurisdiction. 143
The Third Circuit similarly interpreted the Calder effects
test in Imo Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG.144 The plaintiff, Imo,
alleged that the defendant, Kiekert, had tortiously interfered
140
See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. Toeppen had registered domain names
knowing that this action would injure Panavision in California. See id. Furthermore,
Toeppen sent a letter to Panavision in California demanding money. See id. According
to the court the state law claims required the same analysis as the federal claims
and that the federal trademark analysis would be the same in either California or Illinois. See id.
141 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. The alternative forum factor weighed in the
Toeppen's favor because California was not the only forum in which the suit could be
tried. See id. at 1324. As to the burden on the plaintiff of litigating outside of California, the court stated that little weight should be given to this factor. See id. This factor focuses on evaluating the convenience and effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff,
which the court stated was given little weight. See id., citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476.
The court found the burden on Panavision to be slight and thus it weighed in Toeppen's favor. See Panavision 141 F.3d at 1324.
142 See id. at 1323-1324. The efficient resolution factor had little to no impact on
the reasonableness analysis here because the case involved few witnesses and limited
evidence. See id.
143 See id. at 1324.
144 155 F.3d 254, 260-265 (3d Cir. 1998). In [mo, the court stated that because
the injury resulted from an alleged intentional tort, the satisfaction of the Calder effects test would allow the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See [mo,
155 F.3d at 256. The [mo court interpreted the Calder effects test similar to the
Ninth Circuit. See id. at 265-266. In the Ninth Circuit this test is satisfied by first,
showing that a defendant committed an intentional act that second, was expressly
aimed at the forum state, which third, caused harm that was largely felt in the forum state, which the defendant should have anticipated. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473
citing Core· Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486. The court required 1) an intentional tort that; 2)
causes plaintiff to feel the brunt of the harm in the forum state such that it can be
described as the focal point of the harm; and 3) the defendant must have expressly
aimed tortious conduct at the forum state so that it can be described as the focal
point of the tort. See [mo, 155 F.3d at 265-266.
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with plaintiff's attempt to sell its Italian subsidiary to a
French corporation. 145 The only contact Kiekert had with the
forum state of New Jersey, consisted of two letters, one sent
to Italy and the other New York, which were then forwarded
to Imo in New Jersey.146 In applying the effects test, the court
declined to follow the Seventh Circuit's broad application of
the test, and instead recognized that the majority of the circuits applied the effects test to business torts narrowly.147 The
Imo court agreed with the conclusions of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits that the effects test
145 See id. at 256. Kiekert sent a series of letters to the Italian subsidiary and to
a New York investment firm representing Imo in the attempted sale, which
threatened to revoke Kiekert's licensing agreement with the subsidiary. See id. This
allegedly caused the sale to fall through, resulting in considerable losses. See id.
146 See id. at 258-260. Additionally, Imo and Kiekert executives conducted business meetings in Germany and Canada, and Imo had placed a few phone calls to
Kiekert in Germany. See Imo, 155 F.3d at 258-260. The court noted that the weight of
authority among the circuits established that some minimal correspondence alone
was sufficient to satisfY the minimum contacts requirement for the purposes of specific jurisdiction. See id. at 259-260 n.3.
147 See id. at 261-263. The Seventh Circuit stated that the state in which the victim suffers a tortious injury may exercise personal jurisdiction over the alleged
tortfeasor. See Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997), citing Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411-412. A tort does not occur until an actual injury occurs. See Janmark, 132 F.3d at 1202; but see Berthold Types Limited v. European
Milkograf Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (where the court distinguishes that in Janmark the claim concerned interference with prospective economic
advantage which did not occur until the customer canceled the order in Illinois).
However, in the context of trademark violation, the place of sale is deemed where the
tort occurs not the place of economic harm. See id. Compare Clearclad Coatings, Inc.
v. Xontal Ltd., No. 98 C 7199, 1999 WL 652030 at *17 (N.D. Ill. 1999), citing
Janmark, 132 F.3d at 1202 (where the district court found the tort from a trademark
infringement claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 occurred in Illinois because that is where·
the injury (bad financial consequences) occurred. The Janmark court reasoned that
when the plaintiff corporation suffered the loss of a customer that loss occurred in illinois, the forum state where the plaintiff's sales operations were based. See
Janmark, 132 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, a California defendant's phone call to a New
Jersey customer causing the customer to cancel an order with an Illinois based
defendant caused an injury in Illinois. See id. at 1202-1203. Thus, jurisdiction was
proper. See id. The court in Janmark did not address whether the defendant knew
where plaintiff was located. This knowledge is required for both the "express aiming"
prong and the "brunt of the harm prong." Imo, 155 F.3d at 264 n.6. The court in Imo,
stated that while the Janmark court may have assumed that the defendant had
knowledge of the location of the plaintiff, this was not sufficient to satisfY the knowledge requirement of the expressly aimed prong or the brunt of the harm/focal point of
the harm prong in the Third Circuit. See id.
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requires more than the mere showing that an intentional tort
was felt within the forum. 148 Furthermore, the court agreed
with the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits that the effects test
may be satisfied only if the plaintiff can point to specific contacts that show the defendant expressly aimed its act at the
particular state, thereby rendering the forum state the focal
point1 49 of the tortious activity.150 The court continued that
this typically requires some form of entry into the forum
state. 151 The Imo court focused only on the "expressed aiming"
requirement. 152 The court found that Kiekert, unlike the
defendant in Cybersell, knew that Imo was located in the forum state. 153 The court stated that this knowledge, while necessary, did not alone satisfy the express aiming prong. 154 The
court determined that the letters revealed that Kiekert focused its intentions on First Boston in New York and Roltra
in Italy, not on Imo in the forum state, New Jersey.155 Thus,
148 See [mo, 155 F.3d at 265. See also Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d
1071, 1077-1078 (10th Cir. 1995) (intentional business tort alone is not enough to satisfy the effects test); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-773
(5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's fortuitous location of its principle place of business within
the forum without evidence of express aiming or knowledge of the location of the
brunt of the harm is not enough to support the exercise of jurisdiction); ESAB Group,
Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-626 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1048 (1998) (defendant's mere knowledge that conduct would lower plaintiffs sales
does not satisfy the expressly aimed prong nor does knowledge of plaintiffs principal
place of business with out more show that the brunt of the harm prong has been
met); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-420 (9th Cir. 1997) (effects
test not met where web site was not expressly aimed at nor was knowledge of location of brunt of harm shown); General Electric Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d
1376, 1387-1388 (8th Cir. 1993) (effects test not satisfied where the brunt of the
harm occurs outside of the forum); Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 90-92 (1st
Cir. 1998) (effects test not satisfied even though effect was felt in forum, where no
showing of intentional targeting).
149 The [mo court noted that they did not accept or reject the notion that the effects of Kiekert's conduct were felt in by the plaintiff in New Jersey because its decision did not reach this issue. See [mo, 155 F.3d at 265-266 n9. However the court
mentioned that it was unclear as to whether a corporation could feel the effects of
tortious conduct in a particular geographic location. See id.
160 See id. at 265.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 266.
153 See [mo, 155 F.3d at 266.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 267. The court looked at whether the letters, phone calls, and meetings constituted sufficient evidence of express aiming. See id. at 266-267. Kiekert did
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because the defendant did not engage in conduct expressly
aimed at the forum state, the court did not determine
whether the brunt of the harm was felt in the forum state. 156
The court concluded that Imo failed to meet the minimum
contacts requirement of the effects test. 157

3. Cease & Desist Letters
A debate has developed among the Ninth Circuit district
courts as to how to treat cease and desist letters for purposes
of establishing specific jurisdiction. 158 At first glance, the district courts appear to have a split in opinion as to whether
"cease and desist" letters alone are sufficient contacts to satisfy the minimum contacts test. 159 A closer inspection reveals
that the cases are distinguishable.
The United States District Court for the Central District
of California, in Douglas Furniture Co. v. Wood Dimensions,
Inc.,160 addressed whether sending two cease and desist letters
established sufficient contacts with California. 161 The court
applied the three-part specific jurisdiction test used in the
Ninth Circuit1 62 and found that the exercise of jurisdiction
not originate any of the phone calls conducted with Imo and, therefore, did not expressly aim its actions toward New Jersey. See id. at 267. Compare Brainerd v. Governors of the University of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1258-1260 (9th Cir. 1990) (uninitiated telephone calls and the response to a letter were sufficient to satisfy the effects
test).
156 The Imo court noted that they did not accept or reject the notion that the effects of Kiekert's conduct were felt in by the plaintiff in New Jersey because its decision'did not reach this issue. See Imo, 155 F.3d at 265-266 n.9. However the court
mentioned that it was unclear as to whether a corporation could feel the effects of
tortious conduct in a particular geographic location. See id.
157 See id. at 268.
158 See Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (D. Colo. 1999).
159 See id.
160 963 F.Supp. 899 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
161 See id. at 900-901. In Douglas Furniture, the defendant Wood Dimensions,
Inc., an Arizona corporation, sent plaintiff Douglas Furniture, a California corporation, two cease and desist letters. See id. at 900. The letters alleged that Douglas
Furniture was marketing a table set that was substantially identical to a table set in
which Wood Dimensions claimed it had a proprietary right. See id. The letters
threatened legal action if Douglas Furniture did not immediately cease selling the table set. See id.
162 In the Ninth Circuit this test is satisfied by first, showing that a defendant
committed an intentional act that second, was expressly aimed at the forum state,
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was improper under all three prongs,163 The court distinguished between letters that had a tortious effect in and of
themselves, such as letters containing defamatory statements,
and letters, the contents of which, do not constitute an actionable injury.l64 Since Wood Dimensions' cease and desist letters
complained about the tortious conduct of Douglas Furniture,
and were not tortious in and of themselves, the court determined that the standard set for the commercial context applied. 165 In the commercial context, the use of the mail or the
telephone does not constitute purposeful activity invoking the
protections and benefits of the forum state. 166 Thus, the court
found that the purposeful availment prong had not been satisfied. 167 The court continued that even if the letters constituted
purposeful availment, they did not satisfy the second prong of
the specific jurisdiction test, which requires that the claim
arise out of the forum-related contacts. 168 The court noted that
the only connection between the letters and the cause of action was that they may have motivated Douglas Furniture to
file suit, but that this was insufficient to meet the requirements of the "arising out of" prong. 169 Finally, the court stated
that it would be unreasonable to require an intellectual property owner to face suit in a foreign forum based on a letter attempting to protect intellectual property rights. 170
The United States District Court for the Central District
of California in Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf
Starware, LLCl7l subsequently criticized the Douglas Furniwhich third, caused harm that was largely felt in the forum state, which the defendant should have anticipated. See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473-474
(9th Cir. 1995) citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th
Cir. 1993).
163 See Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 901-903.
164 See id. at 902 n.1.
165 See id. at 902.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 902-903.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 903. The court found that even considering Burger King's requirement that the defendant affirmatively show the unreasonablity of a court's assertion
of jurisdiction it would on its face be unfair to impose such a burden on an intellectual property holder. See id. Consequently, the court dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See id.
171 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1157, 1158 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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ture decision. In Meade, the defendant Reddwarf, sent one
cease and desist letter to plaintiff Meade and one to a customer of Meade's both of which were located in California. 172
The court disagreed with Douglas Furniture's holding that
cease and desist letters with nothing more do not constitute
sufficient contacts to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the specific jurisdiction test. l73 The court stated that
the Douglas Furniture holding inconsistently applied the current jurisdictional trend in light of the holding in Panavision. 174 The court reiterated Panavision's holding that the
"something more" requirement of Cybersell was satisfied by a
subjective intent to do harm by performing an act, the effect
of which is felt in the forum state. 175 Thus, the Meade court
applied the effects test as stated in the Ninth Circuit. 176 The
court found that Reddwarf's cease and desist letters that demanded that Meade discontinue the use of an invention
claimed by a United States patent or face the legal consequences had a chilling effect on Meade's business. 177 This chilling effect, intentionally directed by the defendant towards
California, resulted from the sending of the cease and desist
letters.178 The court found the exercise of jurisdiction over
Reddwarf was reasonable because Reddwarf, by threatening a
lawsuit, had notice that a California court might exercise jurisdiction over it based on its threats. 179 Therefore, the Meade
court concluded that the mailing of two cease and desist letters to California satisfied the specific jurisdiction minimum
contacts test,180
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently criticized the Meade decision in Wise v.
Lindamood. 181 In Wise, defendants Patricia Lindamood, a resident of California, and Lindamood-Bell, a California corporation, (hereinafter, "Lindamood"), engaged in communications
172
173

174
175
176

177
178
179
180

181

See id at 1158 n.4.
See id.
See id. at 1158 n.2.
See id.
See Meade, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1157-1159.
See id. at 1158 n.4.
See id. at 1158 n.3.
See id. at 1159.
See id.
89 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (D.Coio. 1999).
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with plaintiffs Barbara Wise and Remedies for Reading Disabilities, Inc. a Colorado resident and corporation respectively,
(hereinafter, "Wise").182 In the course of this communication
Lindamood sent Wise two cease and desist letters.183 The Wise
court stated that the touchstone inquiry was whether the
defendant had purposefully directed activities, which the suit
arises out of and whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. l84 The court cited Douglas Furniture for the proposition that the suit resulted from the alleged tortious conduct of
Lindamood and did not result or arise from the cease and desist letters.185 The court stated that the exercise of jurisdiction
based on two cease and desist letters would allow the unilateral activity of one party or third person to subject another to
the jurisdictional reach of the forum state in contradiction of
the fair play and substantial justice requirement of Burger
King. 186 The court recognized that a split in authority existed
as to whether a cease and desist letter constituted sufficient
contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction. 187 The court
concluded that the courts that had taken what it deemed to
be the minority position, that jurisdiction was proper based on
multiple cease and desist letters, were in tension with the
precedent from their respective circuits. 188 Therefore, the Wise
See id. at 1188-1189. Lindamood believed that Wise was infringing on copyright and trademark rights to developmental programs authored by Patricia
Lindamood and her late husband. See id.
183 See id. at 1189. Wise filed suit seeking declaratory judgment of noninfringement in a United States District Court for the District of Colorado. See id.
184 See Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1190. The court found that the letters were insufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction. See id. at 119l.
185 See id. citing Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 902.
186 See id. See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, quoting International Shoe, 326
U.S. at 320.
187 See Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1192.
188 See id. For decisions rendering personal jurisdiction proper on the basis of
multiple cease and desist letters see generally Meade, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1157; BountyFull Entertainment, Inc. v. Forever Blue Entertainment Group, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 950
(S.D. Tex. 1996); Burbank Aeronautical Corp. II v. Aeronautical Development Corp.,
16 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1069 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Tandem Computers Inc. v. Yuter, No. C
89-20646 RFP, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18384 (N.D. Cal. 1989). For personal jurisdiction based on multiple phone calls, letters, or facsimiles, see generally Oki America,
Inc. v. Tsakanikas, No. C 93-20728, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19475 (N.D. Cal. 1993);
Edwards v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 716 F.Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1989). One court determined that a single cease and desist letter satisfied the minimum contacts test,
182
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court chose to follow what it claimed to be the majority position, that a cease and desist letter alone is not sufficient to
support the exercise of jurisdiction. 189
IV.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

In Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, Inc., 190
the Ninth Circuit considered whether California properly asserted personal jurisdiction over Augusta. 191 The court stated
that because California allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction under its long arm statute to the fullest extent permitted by due process, the determination of whether jurisdiction
is proper must be confined to constitutional limitations. 192
see generally Doleo Packaging Corp. v. Creative Industries, Inc., 1 u.S.P.Q.2D (BNA)
1586 (C.D. Cal. 1986). For circuit .courts that are in tension with district courts that
have found personal jurisdiction to exist based on cease and desist letters See Ham v.
La Cienega Music Company, 4 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 1993); Peterson V. Kennedy,
771 F.2d 1244, 1261-1262 (9th Cir. 1985).
189 See Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1192. For courts determining that they lacked personal jurisdiction see generally Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148
F.3d 1355, 1360-1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Med-Tec, Inc. v. Kostich, 980 F.Supp. 1315,
1329 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Stairmaster SportslMedical Products, Inc. v. Pacific Fitness
Corp., 916 F.Supp. 1049 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Zumbro, Inc. v. California Natural Prods.,
861 F.Supp. 773, 781 (D.Minn. 1994); Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising
and Publishing Corp., 825 F.Supp. 1195, 1213 (D.N.J. 1993); BIB Mfg. Co. v. Dover
Mfg. Co., 804 F.Supp. 1129, 1132-1133 (E.D. Mo. 1992); KVH Industries, Inc. v.
Moore, 789 F.Supp. 69 (D. R.1. 1992).
190 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
191 See id. at 1084. The court disagreed with Augusta's threshold arguments that
the appeal was moot due to a settlement offer and a change in NSI's dispute resolution policy. See id. at 1085. Augusta had offered to waive all trademark infringement,
dilution, and unfair competition claims if Bancroft agreed to stay out of the golf business. See id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the appeal was not rendered moot because
the promise was qualified and secondly the agreement, if made, would not have
mooted Bancroft's request that Augusta's "Masters" trademarks be cancelled. See id.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Augusta's assertion raised at oral argument that the
appeal was moot because NSI's dispute resolution procedures had changed. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085. Since, this argument was not developed on appeal and unsupported in the record the Ninth Circuit stated it was unable to evaluate the merits of
the argument. See id. The Ninth Circuit stated that where no evidentiary hearing is
held by the district court, Augusta's assertion that there were insufficient facts is irrelevant because on appeal the court will presume the facts set forth in the pleadings
and supporting declarations can be proven. See id.
192 See id. at 1086. See also Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir.
1996).
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GENERAL JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit initially distinguished general personal
jurisdiction from specific personal jurisdiction. 193 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a defendant, who has "substantial" or "continuous
and systematic" contacts with the forum state, may be haled
into court in the forum state regardless of the contacts' rela~
tion to the suit. 194 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial
court's determinations that Augusta's contacts with California
did not amount to substantial or continuous and systematic
contacts. 195 The Ninth Circuit described Augusta's web site. as
"passive,"196 meaning that consumers could not use it to make
purchases or to exchange information. 197 Finally, the court determined that occasional unsolicited sales of tournament tickets and merchandise to residents of California did not suffice
to meet the general jurisdiction standard. 19B Therefore, the
court concluded that Augusta's contacts were not sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction. 199
See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086.
See id. citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
415 (1984). The Ninth Circuit considered the following factors in determining if the
defendant's contacts are sufficient to support general personal jurisdiction; whether
the defendant:· 1) makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the forum state or
serves its markets; 2) has a designated agent for service of process; 3) is licensed or
incorporated in the forum. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086, citing Hirsch v. Blue
Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986).
195 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is "fairly high." See Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986).
The court noted Augusta had no bank accounts in California, was not licensed or registered to do business in California, and did not pay taxes in California. See Bancroft,
223 F.3d at 1086. Additionally, Augusta did not target print, television, or radio advertising toward California. See id.
196 A passive web site generally only furnishes information to those who visit the
site, and is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Tech
Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149-1150 (D. Or.
2000).
197 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086.
198 See id. The court distinguished between Augusta's license agreements with
two television networks and a few vendors in California as doing business with California not in California. See id.
199 See id.
193

194
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SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit next analyzed whether the trial court
had specific personal jurisdiction over Augusta on the basis
that the case arose out of Augusta's forum related acts. 200 The
Ninth Circuit stated that specific jurisdiction exists if the
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privileges of
the forum state. 201 Additionally, the claim must have arisen
out of the defendant's forum related activities and lastly, the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must be
reasonable. 202
1. Purposeful Availment

The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test requires
that the defendant purposefully avail him or herself of the
privileges of the forum state. 203 In addressing the first prong,
the Ninth Circuit focused on Augusta's letter to NSI in Virginia. 204 The letter, which contested Bancroft's right to use the
"masters. com" domain name, triggered NSI's dispute resolution policy forcing Bancroft to bring suit or lose control of its
web site. 205 The Ninth Circuit conducted a prima facie jurisdictional analysis and was, therefore, required to accept Bancroft's factual allegations as true. 206 Bancroft alleged that the
letter sent by Augusta to NSI in Virginia intended to affect
Bancroft in California and thereby satisfied the effects test. 207
The Ninth Circuit recognized that in order for the Calder effects test to be satisfied there must have been an: 1) intentional act; 2) expressly aimed at the forum state; 3) causing
harm that the defendant knows the brunt of which will be felt
in the forum state. 208
See id.
See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. See also Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130
F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).
202 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086.
203 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086, citing Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416.
204 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087.
205 See id.
206 See id.
201 See id.
208 See id. See also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321.
200

201
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Applying the effects test, the Ninth Circuit summarily
concluded that Augusta's letter to NSI was an intentional act
because Augusta acted intentionally when it sent the letter.209
In addition the court found that the letter sent to NSI in Virginia satisfied the third "brunt of the harm" requirement of
the effects test. 210 The court stated that since the effect of the
intentional act was to cause harm, the brunt of which was felt
in California and Augusta knew the harm would be felt in
California, the third requirement had been satisfied. 211
Regarding the express aiming requirement, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the effects test would not be satisfied by a
mere foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state. 212
Rather, the plaintiff must show "something more."213 The
court stated that "express aiming" at the forum is the "something more" discussed but not spelled out in prior cases. 214
The court then stated that the express aiming requirement is
satisfied if the defendant targeted wrongful conduct at an individual whom the defendant knew to be a resident of the forum state. 215 The court asserted that individualized targeting
of wrongful conduct stood as the distinguishing fact in determining whether the effects test could be satisfied. 216
The Ninth Circuit illustrated the individualized targeting
requirement by contrasting Calder with Cybersell v. Cybersell.217 The court noted that in Calder, the defendants' knowledge that the article would potentially cause an injury, the
brunt of which would be felt in California and its intentional
publication sufficed to establish jurisdiction over the defendSee Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
See id.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 1087.
213 See id. citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.
214 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. See also Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322;
Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 418.
215 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087-1088.
216 See id. at 1088. See also Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d
1062, 1065-1066 (9th Cir. 1990); Brainerd V. Governors of the University of Alberta,
873 F.2d 1257, 1259-1260 (9th Cir. 1989); Gordy V. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 833
(9th Cir. 1996); Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1422-1423 (9th Cir. 1987); Haisten v.
Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986).
217 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
21)9

210
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ants. 218 Since the article in Calder, was written about Shirley
Jones, a well-known Californian, the writer clearly knew that
she would suffer the brunt of the harm in California. 219 However, in Cybersell, the court determined jurisdiction was not
proper because no evidence indicated that the defendants
knew of the existence of the plaintiffs and individually
targeted wrongful conduct at them.220 In Cybersell, the defendant allegedly infringed on a service mark held by an Arizona
corporation by merely maintaining a home page on the World
Wide Web that was accessible to Arizonans. 221 Thus, the
Cybersell court concluded that the defendant did not individually target the plaintiff.222
In analyzing the letter sent by Augusta to NSI, the Ninth
Circuit found that Augusta's letter more closely resembled the
expressly aimed actions described in Calder.223 Similar to Calder, the court found that the letter individually targeted Bancroft in California where Bancroft was doing business almost
exclusively.224 Additionally, the court likened Bancroft to
Panavision in which the defendant, Toeppen, had deliberately
chosen to register the plaintiff Panavision's trademarks in or~
der to extort compensation. 225 In Panavision, Toeppen individually targeted Panavision's web site, knowing that Panavision
had trademark rights to the web site's name. 226 Furthermore,
Panavision's principal place of business was in the forum
state, California. 227 The Panavision court, therefore, concluded
that the express aiming requirement was satisfied by Toeppen's "scheme" to register trademarks in order to extort
money from Panavision. 228 The Ninth Circuit analogized that,
like Toeppen, Augusta knew Bancroft held the "masters. com"
web site, which would be affected if the NSI dispute resoluSee id. at 1087. See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984).
See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-790.
220 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088, citing Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d
414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997).
221 See Cybersell Inc, 130 F.3d at 415.
222 See id. at 419-420.
223 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
224 See id.
226 See id. See also Panauision, 141 F.3d at 132l.
226 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d a 1088, citing Panauision, 141 F.3d at 132l.
227 See Panauision, 141 F.3d at 132l.
228 See id. 1321-1322.
218

219
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tion policy were triggered. 229 Thus, Augusta's letter to NSI individually targeted Bancroft in the forum state of California
thereby satisfying the express aiming requirement. 23o
Since writing and sending the letter was an intentional
act, targeting Bancroft in California, and Augusta knew that
the brunt of the harm would be felt in California, the effects
test had been satisfied. 231 Therefore, having satisfied the effects test, the Ninth Circuit determined that the purposeful
availment prong for specific jurisdiction had been met. 232

2. Contacts Gave. Rise To The Suit.
The Ninth Circuit looked to whether Augusta's contacts,
which gave rise to its purposeful availment of the California
forum, also gave rise to the current suit.233 Utilizing a "but
for" causation analysis,234 the court stated that but for the letter that Augusta sent to NSI, triggering the dispute resolution policy, Bancroft would not have been forced to bring suit
against Augusta. 235 Therefore, the court concluded that .the
second prong of specific jurisdiction had been met. 236

3. Reasonableness Of Exercising Specific Jurisdiction
The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's
finding that California's exercise of jurisdiction was unreasonable, because the defendant did not present a compelling case
regarding the seven reasonableness factors.237 If a defendant
229 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. Although the court did not say so, one may assume that because Bancroft conducted almost all of its business in California, Augusta knew or should have known that California was the forum where the tortious
harm would occur.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995).
235 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 1088-1089. The court stated that a general denial of reasonableness, supported by questionable precedent is not enough to defeat Burger King's requirement that the defendant present a compelling case regarding the seven reasonableness factors. See id., citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-477
(1985).
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has purposefully directed his activities towards the forum
state, the defendant must present a compelling case that
other considerations would render the exercise of jurisdiction
unreasonable. 238 The Ninth Circuit distinguished those cases
based solely on cease and desist letters, where jurisdiction
has been found unreasonable, from Augusta's letter to NSI. 239
The court stated that the letter did more than warn or
threaten Bancroft because under NSI's dispute resolution policy the letter operated to automatically place Bancroft's web
site on hold unless Bancroft filed suit. 240 The court concluded
that the district court erred in finding jurisdiction unreasonable, because Augusta had failed to demonstrate a specific reason why the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. 241
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order and
remanded for further proceedings.242
C. CONCURRING OPINION

Judge Sneed, joined by Judge Trott, concurred in the
opinion only on the grounds that on remand it could be shown
that Augusta intended to engage in tortious conduct. 243 Judge
Sneed stated that had Augusta acted in good faith to protect
its trademark, rather than in an effort to effect a conversion
of the domain name, California's exercise of jurisdiction was
ripe for challenge. 244

v.

CRITIQUE

A. THE EFFECTS TEST: KNOWLEDGE BUT NOT INTENT

In Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc, the
Ninth Circuit determined that Augusta had committed an intentional tort by sending a letter to NSI.245 The court reasoned that the letter's triggering of the dispute resolution pol-·
238
239

240

241
242

243
244
245

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Bancroft 223 F.3d at 1088 citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-477.
Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1089.
id.
id.
id.
id.
Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1089.
id. at 1088.
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icy, which threatened Bancroft's use of its web site, was
sufficient to establish that the act was tortious. 246 Had NSI's
dispute resolution policy not required that Bancroft's web site
be placed on hold, the court would probably not have deemed
Augusta's actions as tortious. The concurrence supported the
exercise of jurisdiction on the assumption that Augusta "engaged in tortious conduct, i.e., that they intended to effect a
conversion of the <masters. com> domain name."247 While the
concurring opinion states that jurisdiction depends on
whether a tortious act was committed, the example used suggests that the crucial inquiry was whether the tort had been
committed intentionally. Thus, the concurrence concluded that
the exercise of jurisdiction turned on whether Augusta's letter
to NSI constituted an intentional tortious act.248
The negative implications of the concurring opinion suggests that the majority held that jurisdiction would be proper
even if Augusta was merely seeking to protect its trademark.
Thus, according to the majority opinion the mere fact that
Augusta's letter had a tortious effect, that Augusta knew was
likely to occur, established jurisdiction under the effects
test. 249 The fact that two judges concurred, stating that jurisdiction might not be proper if Augusta was merely seeking to
protect its trademark from dilution, implies that knowledge
without intent would not permit the exercise of jurisdiction
under the concurring opinion.
The disagreement between the majority and concurring
opinions seems to be over whether the defendant needs to
have only knowledge that a tortious effect is likely to occur, or
whether the defendant needs to have intended the tortious effect to occur. The majority's opinion supports the former proposition. This seems correct under the Ninth Circuit's effects
test, because the intentional act prong is analyzed separately
from the prong requiring knowledge of the tortious effect.25o
See id.
See id. at 1089.
248 See id.
249 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087-1088.
250 The separation of the knowledge and intent prongs would not pose such a
problem if the intent requirement was analyzed by using the three elements of intent
described by the Restatement. The Restatement requires "a state of mind (2) about
consequences of an act (or omission) and not about the act ifself, and (3) it extends
246
247
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The separation of these prongs led to an unfair result in this
case and suggests that the concurring opinion offers the wiser
course. 251 The result of the majority opinion seems unfair because while Bancroft had agreed to NSI's dispute resolution
procedure concerning the "masters. com" domain name, Augusta had not. Subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction
in the forum state on the basis of contractual relations between the plaintiff and a third party is unjust. 252
B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION WITHOUT FORUM RELATED ACTIVITIES

Assuming that the effects test was satisfied, the Ninth
Circuit in Bancroft, allowed the assertion of specific jurisdiction on what appears to be the lowest threshold of forum related activities or contacts allowed to date. In Calder v.
Jones,253 the slanderous article was published in a national
magazine sold in the State of California. In Ziegler v. Indian
River County,254 the defendants improperly obtained a Florida
arrest warrant which they then used to effectuate Ziegler's arrest in California. 255 In Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,256 the
defendant sent letters to California demanding payment and
not only to having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about given consequences but also to having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given consequences
are substantially certain to result from the act." PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF
TORTS 34 (w. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
The Bancroft court merely stated that Augusta acted intentionally when it sent its
letter to NSI. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
251 In Calder, this distinction is difficult because while the defendant's intended
to libel the plaintiff, it was not shown that they intended the tortious effect of their
libel. Rather, the intent of their article was to attract readers. Thus, a requirement
that the defendant intended the tortious effect may conflict with the holding of
Calder.
252 Under the reasoning of Bancroft, a plaintiff's contractual relations with a
third party allowed for the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. This is unfair
because generally the court focuses on the defendant's forum related conduct in determining whether jurisdiction may be asserted. When a court exercises jurisdiction
beyond its territory the due process inquiry is whether the defendant's acts have
given rise to notice that jurisdiction might be asserted. See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475 (1985).
253 See 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984).
254 64 F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1995).
255 See id. at 474.
256 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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threatening Panavision with future tortious conduct. 257 In
Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf Starware, LLC.,258 the
defendant sent a cease and desist letter to a California customer of Meade's, which caused harm to Meade in California. 259 Thus, while in all these cases the defendant's contacts
with California were highly attenuated, in each case the
defendant acted in a manner that established a contact, tie,
or relationship within the forum state of California. The
Ninth Circuit in Bancroft required no such entry into the forum, or forum related activity. Augusta in Georgia sent its
letter to NSI in Virginia. Augusta had no contractual relations with NSI concerning its trademark rights for the name
"masters." The court merely stated that the "contacts constituting purposeful availment must be the ones that give rise to
the current suit."260 It appears the court considered either Augusta's letter to NSI or the letter's effect in California as the
contact constituting purposeful availment. 261
If the court used the effect of Augusta's letter as the basis
for satisfying the requirement that the suit arose out of forum
related activities; the requirement is pointless because anyone
injured by an intentional tort could automatically bring suit
in whatever forum they felt the effect. 262 Specific jurisdiction
requires that the suit arose out of forum related activities,
but under Bancroft, the effects test is used to satisfy the requirement. 263 The effects test does not, however, require there
to be forum related activity.264 Therefore, using the effects test
to satisfy the requirement that the suit arose out of forum reSee id. at 1318-1319.
47 U.S.P.Q 2d. 1157 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
259 See id. at 1157-1159.
260 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
261 If the court relied on the letter alone (and not its effect), it is a stretch to
paint the letter a forum related activity.
262 Of course, the effects test would first have to be satisfied and jurisdiction
would have to be reasonable.
263 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
284 The express aiming prong of the effects test is satisfied when the defendant
engages in tortious conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a
resident of the forum state. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. Such conduct is not however always forum related where it is possible to injure the plaintiff in some foreign
state. If such conduct did establish a relationElhip with the forum, it is unclear what
that the relationship consists of other than a tortious effect.
257

258
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lated activities is illogical. A clearer test might state that in
order for a court to assert jurisdiction over an out of state
defendant for an intentional tort, the effects test must be satisfied and jurisdiction must be reasonable. This removes the
requirement that the suit arose out of forum related activity
and thus separates the test from the specific jurisdiction analysis. Since the Ninth Circuit does not appear to be requiring
forum related activities anyway, clarification of the test would
be appropriate. 265
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Bancroft decision adds to the debate among the district courts in the Ninth Circuit as to whether a cease and desist letter alone constitutes sufficient contacts for the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant. The language used by
the Meade and Wise courts indicates disagreement on the issue. 266 However, the reasoning of Bancroft supports the conclusion that the cases are not in conflict and are in fact distinguishable. 267 The question is not whether a cease and
desist letter creates a sufficient basis for the exercise of juris265 See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, No. 99-15873, No. 99-15902, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1539, at *14 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2001) (where the test used is whether defendant's conduct outside of the forum caused plaintiff to suffer harm in the forum). In
Myers, the Utah defendant's contacts with National Data Research in Arizona, had a
tortious effect in Nevada. See id.; see also Report & Recommendation of U.S. Mag. J.
at 6, Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, DC No. CV-S-98-01179-DWH-(RHL). The District
Court for the District of Nevada dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, apparently relying on the recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge, that a foreign act
causing plaintiff injury does not give rise to jurisdiction in the forum state of Nevada
based on the mere fortuitous fact that plaintiff's reside in Nevada. See Report & Recommendation of U.S. Mag. J. at 6, Myers, DC No. CV-S-98-01179-DWH-(RHL); Myers,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1539, at *1. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the
defendant's communication from Utah to Arizona was sufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Nevada based on the effects of those acts. See Myers,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1539, at *17. The Ninth Circuit used the novel term "local conduct" to describe the basis on which the claim arose. See id. at *14. The court did not
clarify on what authority it relied for determining that local conduct could satisfy the
second prong of its personal jurisdiction analysis, which it merely described as causation. See id.
266 See Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf Starware LLC., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1157, 1158 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1192
(D. Colo. 1999).
267 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087-1088.
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diction, but rather whether the letter in and of itself has an
intentional tortious effect. The Bancroft court found that a
tortious effect resulted from Augusta's intentional act and
that the application of the effects test was appropriate. 268 This
reasoning, therefore, distinguishes Meade, in which the court
found a tortious effect from Douglas Furniture and Wise, in
which no tortious effect was found. 269
As the use of the Internet grows more cases will involve
only the most remote cyber contacts. The Bancroft facts could
have easily revolved around an e-mail as opposed to a letter.
Bancroft suggests that for cases involving remote contacts,
the crucial jurisdictional inquiry is whether the contacts have
a tortious effect. The Bancroft court's determination that Augusta's letter constituted an intentional tort is questionable
and clearly two concurring judges had some reservations.
However, it is apparent that the exercise of jurisdiction
turned on this determination. Furthermore, the Bancroft
court indicated that the lack of forum related activities for an
intentional tort does not bar the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant. 27o Thus, it is evident that
the Ninth Circuit is leading the expansive jurisdictional trend
of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century.

Christopher Allen Kroblin*

268 In Bancroft, no actual adverse effect to Bancroft's business was shown. Rather
the eminent threat that Bancroft's web site would be placed on hold was enough to
permit the use of the effects test. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087.
269 The Meade, decision relied on the chilling effect on business caused by the
cease and desist letter. See Meade, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1159. In Douglas Furniture, the
court determined that the cease and desist letters did not constitute tortious conduct
in and of themselves. See Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 902. The Douglas Furniture court did not, therefore, apply the effects test and instead dismissed under the
purposeful availment test. See id. See also Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1192.
270 See also Myers, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1539, at *17 (allowing the exercise of
personal jurisdiction on the basis of a mere effect in the forum state regardless of the
absence of forum related activities).
* J.D. candidate, 2002. B.A., Lewis & Clark College, 1997. Thanks to Holly Larsen and Professor Wolcott for your tireless and helpful edits. Dedicated to Mia.
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